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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's law on undue influence in testamentary matters, like
Caesar's Gaul, may be divided into three historical phases. In the first
phase, Florida courts developed what might be called a totality of the
circumstances test to determine the presence of undue influence exer-
cised upon a testator. In the second phase, a burden-shifting eviden-
tiary presumption was developed. The third phase, that began with the
landmark Carpenter' case, saw a marked, fundamental change in the
significance accorded the presumption of undue influence developed in
the second phase. This article will trace the development of Florida's
law of undue influence and examine the possible effect of Florida's evi-
dence code on the strength of presumptions. Finally, this article will
suggest that the Carpenter presumption has occupied too central a role
in undue influence litigation and that both the Bench and Bar should
reexamine the approach to undue influence developed in the first phase.
* Circuit Court Judge for the 19th Judicial Circuit; Masters in Arts and Judicial
Studies, University of Nevada, 1991; J.D., with honors, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1975; A.B., cum laude, Loyola University of Chicago, 1970.
1. In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1971).
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II. THE INITIAL PHASE
Florida courts initially developed a fact-specific test to determine
the presence of undue influence. The 1919 case of Newman v. Smith2 is
illustrative of this approach. In Newman, the testator, shortly before
his death, executed a will that left all his property to his second wife
and disinherited his only child, a daughter.' The facts of the case indi-
cated that a prior will provided for an equal division of the estate be-
tween the daughter and the stepmother." Moreover, the testator had on
numerous occasions expressed an intention to provide for his daughter.'
There was also considerable medical evidence concerning his mental
capacity insofar as it related to his susceptibility to the influence of
others.' Additional evidence suggested that the stepmother, during the
father's last illness and hospitalization, attempted to prevent the daugh-
ter from seeing her father.7 Finally, the evidence revealed a close, af-
fectionate relationship between the daughter and the father 8 as con-
trasted with the less than cordial relations between the decedent and
the stepmother.9 This antipathy also extended to the stepmother's
family. 10
The Newman court initially defined undue influence as "over-per-
suasion, coercion, or force that destroys or hampers the free agency and
willpower of the testator."" The court also recognized that "undue in-
fluence can seldom, if ever, be established by direct evidence," but is
often "conclusively shown by its results." 2 Undue influence, the court
held, must "be proven when it appears the testator was of sound
mind." 3 The burden of proof can be satisfied if a "legitimate inference
from the facts and circumstances in the case""' supports such a conclu-
sion. The Newman court found that the following factors in the case
supported a finding of undue influence: 1) an entire change from for-
2. 82 So. 236 (Fla. 1918).
3. Id. at 237.
4. Id. at 238.
5. Id. at 242.
6. Id. at 242-45.
7. Newman, 82 So. at 249.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 242.
I0. Id.
11. Id. at 246.
12. Newman, 82 So. at 251.
13. Id. at 246.
14. Id. at 251-57.
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mer testamentary intentions; 2) an unnatural disposition of property; 3)
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will; 4) the suscep-
tibility of the testator to influence; 5) the conduct of the stepmother in
preventing the daughter from visiting her father; and 6) the poor rela-
tions between the wife and testator."5 The court found in this case what
it characterized as "numerous indications of undue influence." 16 New-
man also illustrates the difficulty of the issue itself. The court's initial
opinion which upheld the disputed will was withdrawn, a motion for re-
hearing granted,1 7 and a switch of one Justice resulted in a finding of
undue influence. 8
In a subsequent case, Hamilton v. Morgan,9 the decedent's chil-
dren attacked their father's will on grounds of undue influence. That
will, by its terms, virtually disinherited the children and left the bulk of
the decedent's estate to his nephews.2 0 The court once again stated that
duly-executed wills should be given effect "unless it clearly appears
that the free use of a sound mind by the testator was in fact prevented
by deception, undue influence or other means ...otherwise the right
given by statute to dispose of property by will would be thwarted."'"
The court, like the court in Newman, employed a fact-specific analysis
that looked to "(1) the character of the transaction; (2) the mental
condition of the parties; and (3) the relationship of the parties."22 The
facts of the case revealed, in the court's words, that "family relations in
the Hamilton home had long been turbulent and rent by domestic cy-
clones." 3 The decedent had been totally alienated from his children
and had been ignored by them during the period shortly before his
death when he was an invalid. 4 In the court's view, the evidence
showed "conclusively a deliberate purpose on the part of the testator,
actuated by resentment . . . to disinherit the contestants who had be-
come estranged from and neglected him and to make the objects of his
bounty those who had consoled and comforted him in the years of his
15. Id. at 251-52.
16. Id. at 251.
17. Newman, 82 So. at 246.
18. Id. at 252.
19. 112 So. 80 (Fla. 1927).
20. Id. at 82.
21. Id. at 81.
22. Id. at 83.
23. Id. at 81.
24. Hamilton, 112 So. at 81.
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decline and misfortune. '2 5 It is interesting that one of the beneficiary
nephews was a physician and treated the decedent.2 6 The court, how-
ever, apparently felt that this circumstance was of no consequence in
view of the other evidence in the case. In addition, a close examination
of the three-part test used by the court indicated that it was a short-
hand method of categorizing evidence relevant to the issue of undue
influence and the court used the categories in determining if undue in-
fluence was present.
In the 1932 case of Gardiner v. Goertner," the court again em-
ployed a fact-specific approach that looked to the totality of the evi-
dence to determine the presence of undue influence. The three-part test
described in Hamilton was again used to categorize relevant evidence
rather than as a presumption or litmus test. In Gardiner, the court reit-
erated the difficulties of proof by observing that "undue influence is
usually not exercised openly in the presence of others so that it may be
directly proved, hence it may be proved by indirect evidence of facts
and circumstances from which it may be inferred."2 9 The court pro-
vided what may be characterized as relevant facts to be considered in
determining the presence of undue influence.30
The factors to be considered on the issue of undue influence
included:
(1) opportunity to exercise, (2) susceptibility of the testator, (3) a
disposition to (by the beneficiary) exercise it, (4) a result that is
indicative, (5) unnatural disposition, (6) persuasion, (7) solicitation
(even if wife or husband), (8) other acts resulting from demon-
strated undue influence, (9) apparent inequality or unreasonable
testamentary disposition, (10) change in former testamentary dis-
positions, (11) interest or motive of a beneficiary, (12) circum-
stances attending execution of the will, (13) will being drawn by
the beneficiary or at his direction, (14) will drawn by a beneficiary
who stands in a confidential relation, and (15) the relations existing
between the testator and the beneficiary."
25. Id. at 82.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 83.
28. 149 So. 186 (Fla. 1933).
29. Id. at 190.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 190-91.
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The Gardiner court, in recognizing this last factor, made reference to a
presumption of undue influence where a confidential relationship exists
between the beneficiary and the testator." A close reading of the case,
however, supports a conclusion that this merely was dicta. In Gardiner,
the supreme court adhered to and arguably refined the fact-specific to-
tality of the circumstances test first used in Hamilton.
In an even later case, In re Donnelly's Estate,3" the court again
continued adherence to the fact-specific test. Adequate resolution, in
the court's view, still required that:
A very wide range of testimony is permissible on the issue of undue
influence. This is due to the fact that undue influence can seldom
be shown except by circumstantial evidence. It results from the
facts and circumstances and surroundings of the testator and his
associations with the person or persons exercising the undue influ-
ence. For this reason, it is proper to consider the testator's dealings
and associations with the beneficiaries; his habits, motives, feelings;
his strength or weakness of character; his confidential family, social
and business relations; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
the will; his mental and physical condition at the time the will was
made; his manner and conduct; and generally every fact which will
throw any light on the issue raised by the charge of undue
influence.3 4
As in Gardiner, the court referred to other states that utilized pre-
sumptions when a beneficiary stood in a confidential relationship to the
testator. 35 The court did not, however, squarely address that issue.
In summary, the Florida Supreme Court initially used a fact-spe-
cific totality of the circumstances test to determine the presence of un-
due influence. This approach recognized the difficulties inherent in
proving undue influence and allowed a searching inquiry into the char-
acter of the transaction, the mental condition of the testator and the
relationship between the parties.36 When using this test, a confidential
relationship and active procurement of the will did not create a pre-
sumption of undue influence, but were used as relevant factors in the
32. Id. at 191.
33. In re Donnelly's Estate, 188 So. 108 (Fla. 1938).
34. Id. at 113.
35. Id. at 113-14.
36. Id.
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evidentiary equation. 37 Thus, during this initial period, no presumption
of undue influence based on a confidential relationship was developed
or recognized.
III. THE PRESUMPTION EMERGES IN PHASE Two
The second phase of Florida's law on undue influence began with
the 1940 case of In re Gottschalk's Estate.88 This case was the earliest
case to squarely hold that a presumption of undue influence could arise
when a specific factual pattern was demonstrated. In Gottschalk, a
companion of the decedent attempted to obtain probate of a will in his
favor.39 The favorable will represented a total and radical change in the
testatrix' previous will.'0 Not unsurprisingly, the new will omitted all
family members, including her adopted daughter who had been the de-
cedent's constant companion for almost 27 years.' Chief Justice Ter-
rell, writing for the court, observed:
When a total stranger moves into the home with an old lady,
secures her confidence, and shows up after her death with a will to
what she has that none of her lawful heirs know anything about,
and which is surrounded by other suspicious circumstances, the
burden is on him to show he came by it as the free voluntary act of
the testatrix.42
The Gottschalk court seemed to erect the presumption because
"[tihe direct evidence in support of undue influence . . . is not as
strong as such issues are sometimes supported." 43 The facts of the case
would seem, however, to support the conclusion of undue influence even
in the fact-specific approach used in the previously discussed cases.
Factually, as indicated earlier, there was a complete change in testa-
mentary scheme. The new disposition omitted the testatrix' "main sup-
37. For other Florida cases applying a fact-specific totality test, see Marston v.
Churchill, 187 So. 762 (Fla. 1939); Henson v. Deniston, 169 So. 624 (Fla. 1936);
Theus v. Theus, 161 So. 76 (Fla. 1935); In re Starr's Estate, 170 So. 620 (Fla. 1935);
Ziegler v. Brown, 150 So. 608 (Fla. 1933).
38. 196 So. 844 (Fla. 1940).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 845.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
43. Gottschalk, 196 So. at 844.
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port, natural beneficiary, and constant companion,"" and was, there-
fore, unnatural." In the court's view, the later will was itself evidence
of undue influence because it was executed secretly under suspicious
circumstances." The beneficiary's marriage proposal, in view of the
wide disparity in ages, also was a factor of some significance in the
court's opinion." Finally, the court looked to the beneficiary's "ample
opportunity to influence the testatrix."'4" Thus, it could quite convinc-
ingly be argued that considering the shorthand relationship of the par-
ties, the character of the transaction and mental condition of the par-
ties, the totality of the circumstances supported a finding of undue
influence. The Gottschalk presumption itself, therefore, appeared to be
fact specific and, unfortunately, provided no guidance with regard to
which facts would raise the presumption.
Therefore, the Gottschalk presumption offered no guidance to trial
courts or the Bar. Indeed, a broad reading of Gottschalk seems to sup-
port a conclusion that the fact-specific approach, if indicative of undue
influence, was not elevated to a burden-shifting presumption. Unfortu-
nately, the supreme court never addressed the questions raised by the
Gottschalk decision. The court, instead of refining or defining the new
presumption, was to render a decision at that time that would change
the entire focus of Florida law on the issue of undue influence. That
case, In re Aldrich's Estate,'49 will therefore require extended discus-
sion with special emphasis on Chief Justice Brown's concurring
opinion.
The court, in the first phase of Aldrich, affirmed per curium, both
the probate and circuit courts' finding of no undue influence.50 This
would have been unremarkable except for the court's next step. Affirm-
ance, the court observed, was appropriate "even though the burden of
proof on the issue of undue influence was technically on the proponents
of the will, a confidential fiduciary relation of patient and his physician
and his business manager existing between the testator and a leading
beneficiary . . . ."'I Affirmance was appropriate due to record evi-
dence that the beneficiaries "served the physical necessity of the testa-
44. Id. at 845.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Gottschalk, 196 So. at 845.
49. .3 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1941).
50. Id. at 857.
51. Id.
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tor during a long illness before and after the will was executed and the
testator had only collateral surviving relatives who had not rendered
him service or attention."5 Aldrich, like Gottschalk, recognized a pre-
sumption of undue influence that appeared to be burden-shifting; i.e.,
requiring the proponent of the will to demonstrate the absence of undue
influence. 3 The Aldrich presumption was, however, more clearly de-
fined as it centered on a fiduciary benefitting from the relationship.84
The court did not, unfortunately, stop there, but went on in a majority
concurring opinion to sow seeds of confusion that would blossom until
pruned by Carpenter.
The concurring opinion, by Chief Justice Brown, provided both a
comprehensive discussion of prior case law on testamentary undue in-
fluence and a systematic exposition of an undue influence presumption
based on a confidential relationship. 55
In his opinion, the Chief Justice conceded that prior Florida case
law had not clearly recognized a presumption of undue influence based
on possible abuse of a confidential relationship. 5 The Gottschalk pre-
sumption, to the Chief Justice, was "raised by a set of circumstances
somewhat unusual" and not dispositive.57 The Chief Justice also ob-
served that prior case law had treated confidential relationships as only
"a circumstance which may be considered on this issue." 58
From this historical vantage point, the Chief Justice then devel-
oped what he viewed as the correct test to support a presumption of
testamentary undue influence.59 That test was based on three primary
sources: two treatises and Alabama case law. 60 A testamentary pre-
sumption of undue influence would arise from: 1) a confidential rela-
tionship between the testator and the beneficiary; 2) active procure-
ment of the will by the beneficiary; and 3) substantial benefit to the
beneficiary. 61 The opinion also discussed the impact of the Probate
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 857.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 857-58.
57. Id. at 858.
58. Id.
59. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 861.
60. Id. at 858-61.
61. Bancroft v. Otis, 8 So. 286 (Ala. 1890); Lyons v. Campbell, 7 So. 250 (Ala.
1890); DANIEL H. REDFEARN. WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA (1933).
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Code upon the proposed presumption. - The applicable probate statute
provided that:
In all proceedings contesting the validity of a purported will,
the: burden of proof, in the first instance, shall be upon the propo-
nent thereof to establish, prima facie, the formal execution and at-
testation thereof, whereupon the burden of proof shall shift to the
contestant to establish the facts constituting the grounds upon
which the probate of such purported will is opposed or revocation
thereof is sought.63
In his view, the presumption was consistent with the statute be-
cause it required the opponent of the will to establish the facts that
supported the presumption itself. 4 The resulting presumption was, to
Chief Justice Brown, "one of fact and not of law. Consequently this
presumption may be rebutted by any evidence which shows that the
testator acted freely and voluntarily in making his will and not under
the coercion or the constraint of the person charged with undue influ-
ence." 65 Thus, the presumption did not in the strict sense effect the
burden of proof, but rather operated on the burden of producing evi-
dence which "rests throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative
of the issue . . . . This burden of proof never shifts during the course
of a trial ... "66
The presumption could then be rebutted factually by an eviden-
tiary showing that,
the testator had independent advice, or the opportunity to avail
themselves of independent advice; or that the beneficiary was not
present at the interview between the testator and the draftsman of
the will, nor present at its execution; nor that the will as made was
not an unnatural will, but such a will as the testator might have
reasonably been expected to make under the circumstances or that
the testator was of sound mind and discussed with his attorney or
the draftsman of the will the amount and character of his property
and the party or parties whom he wished to devise the said prop-
erty to, and, their respective shares, in such a way as to show the
testator was of sound mind and was able to and did, of his own
62. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 861.
63. Id. at 862.
64. Id.
65. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 858.
66. Id. at 861.
1991]
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volition, designate the objects of his bounty, giving good reasons
therefor, or that the disposition of his property as made by the will
was a reasonable or natural one under all the circumstances of the
situation.6
Upon this showing the court could determine the issue "in light of all
the evidence, as to whether the weight of the evidence did, or did not,
show that the will was secured by the exercise of undue influence. '68
It would seem then that a fair reading of the concurring opinion
would result in the conclusion that the proposed presumption was a
Thayer or bursting bubble presumption.69 The opinion apparently left
intact the totality of the circumstances test utilized in earlier cases be-
cause, as indicated previously, rebuttal evidence required the court to
determine the issue from all the evidence in the case and not from use
of the presumption.70 In terms of traditional Florida evidence law, the
presumption, when unrebutted, compelled a finding of undue influence.
If such evidence was introduced, however, the presumption vanished
and the issue would be decided by a review of all the evidence."
Subsequent decisions involving a presumption of undue influence
based on a confidential relationship did not follow the approach out-
lined by the concurring opinion in Aldrich. The presumption was, as
subsequent discussion will demonstrate, treated as one that shifted the
burden of proof to the party who stood in a confidential relationship to
the testator; i.e., as one of law not fact. 2
The 1941 case of In re Eustis' Estate 3 demonstrated Aldrich's
immediate impact. In Eustis, the decedent's nephew, an attorney,
67. Id. at 861.
68. Id. at 862.
69. A Thayer or bursting bubble presumption bursts or vanishes from the case
when contradictory evidence is introduced by the opponent. The underlying facts giving
rise to the presumption will, however, still permit the fact-finder to draw a permissive
inference. A Morgan or burden-shifting presumption places upon the adversary the
burden of proving the non-existence of the presumed fact. This latter presumption can
seriously change the course of a trial. See CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE
62-72 (2d ed. 1982); SPENCER A. GARD, FLORIDA EVIDENCE 768-80 (2d ed. 1980).
The impact of Florida's Evidence Code on the presumption of undue influence that
arises from benefit obtained by one in a relationship of trust and confidence to a dece-
dent will be the subject of further discussion.
70. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 861.
71. Id. at 858.
72. Id.
73. 5 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1941).
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drafted the will and was a principal beneficiary .7 The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's findings of undue influence and observed, the
"[legal presumptions that may have arisen against the appellee be-
cause of his fiduciary relations (attorney) to the testatrix were held by
the lower court to have been overcome by the evidence as to the cir-
cumstances preceding and attendant upon the execution of the will
. .. .' 7 Those circumstances included free intentions by the testatrix,
communication of the contents to other persons before and after execu-
tion, a clear showing of competency of the decedent, and close relations
between the testatrix and the nephew. 76 This language would support a
conclusion that the presumption was indeed of the burden-shifting
variety,
Aldrich and the presumption it created also played a prominent
role in the 1945 case of In re Peters' Estate.7 In Peters, the decedent's
long-time physician was a principal beneficiary. 8 The evidence also es-
tablished that the doctor, although present with others when the con-
tents of the will was discussed by the testatrix, was not present when
the will was drafted or executed. 79 The court approved the trial court's
finding that mere presence when the will was discussed did not consti-
tute active procurement." Thus, the presumption did not arise. In addi-
tion, the court approved the trial court's determination that the facts
were sufficient to overcome the presumption even if it was present.8 1
Those facts, in summary, were knowledge and approval of the contents
by the decedent, disclosure of the will to her attorney, the relations
existing between the decedent and her distant relatives, and the natural
nature of the disposition. 82
In re Palmer's Estate8" continued the Aldrich trend. The trial
court in Palmer found factually that the proponent of the will occupied
a confidential relationship with the decedent, actively participated in
the drafting and execution of the will, and was a principal benefi-
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. 20 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1945).
78. Id. at 488.
79. Id. at 491-92.
80. Id. at 492.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Peters, 20 So. 2d at 492. Peters is also notable because its definition of active
procurement was later accepted by the Carpenter court.
83. In re Palmer's Estate, 48 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1950).
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ciary.8 4 The trial court also determined that the testatrix' mental ca-
pacity was impaired and the beneficiary kept the disputed will exclu-
sively in his possession until after the death of the testatrix.85 Based on
the foregoing factual determinations, the court determined a presump-
tion of undue influence was established.86 The presumption placed upon
the will's proponent the burden "to produce evidence . . . to show that
the will was executed freely and without . . . [undue] influence."'87 The
Florida Supreme Court, citing Redfearn and Peters," affirmed and
found "such facts . . . would be universally held to give rise to a pre-
sumption that undue influence was executed on the testatrix . . . [and
that] [i]t then became the burden of the appellant (proponent) to
prove the absence of undue influence .
The post-Aldrich shift reflected in the previously described cases
continued when district courts of appeal began to address the issue of
undue influence. In re Estate of Knight,90 a 1959 First District Court
of Appeal decision, illustrated this development. In Knight, the trial
court entered a summary judgment sustaining a disputed will.9 ' Evi-
dence in the record supported a conclusion that the testator's brother
who enjoyed a confidential relation with his deceased brother was both
active in procuring the will and was a substantial beneficiary.9" In re-
versing, the First District cited Aldrich and Palmer, and held that
under these facts, "a presumption of undue influence arises, and the
burden rests upon him (the proponent) to overcome the presump-
tion."93 Thus, in the First District's view, "a summary judgment cannot
be entered in favor of one who has the burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption of undue influence . . .
The Third District, in the 1962 case of In re Estate of Reid,95
84. Id. at 733.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. id.
88. REDFEARN, supra note 61; Peters, 20 So. 2d 487.
89. Palmer's, 48 So. 2d at 733 (emphasis added).
90. 108 So. 2d 629, (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
91. Id. at 630.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
94. Id. (emphasis added). The Knight court also relied on the 1955 case on
Zinnser v. Gregory, 77 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1955). The court, in Zinnser, held that the
presumption, while one of fact, did place upon the beneficiary the burden of showing
undue influence was not exercised.
95. 138 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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appeared to add an even heavier burden of proof upon a will proponent
when the presumption was operative. In Reid, the decedent executed a
will naming her attorney as a principal beneficiary.96 The will was pre-
pared and executed by the attorney's law partner.97 The evidence also
established that the attorney beneficiary socialized frequently with the
decedent and took part in her business affairs. 8 He also received
money from the decedent, who was many years his senior, for "escort"
service.99 Finally the evidence indicated the decedent viewed the attor-
ney, to use a current phrase, as her significant other. 00
The Third District initially made reference to the presumption of
undue influence created by three factors; a confidential relationship, ac-
tive procurement, and a principal beneficiary. The court then seemingly
expanded the presumption by observing "[a] much higher degree of
proof is required to overcome an inference of undue influence where the
testator is shown to have impaired mental powers or clouded intellect
than where the testator is strong mentally and in good health."'' In
the court's view, the evidence justified a conclusion that the foregoing
situation was present and attendant upon the proffered will. 0 2 There-
fore, the testimony of Mr. Stafford denying the use of undue influence
was apparently insufficient, as a matter of law, "to rebut the presump-
tion . . .[created by] the confidential relationship ...."103 This testi-
mony was, in the court's view, "not enough to sustain the great burden
the appellee had to carry to rebut the presumption of undue
influence."''
Florida decisions in this second phase expanded the presumption of
undue influence, which was first defined in the Aldrich case. As indi-
cated previously, the Aldrich court viewed the presumption as merely
96. Id. at 343.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 350.
99. Id.
100. Reid, 138 So. 2d at 350.
101. Id. at 349 (citing 57 AM. JUR. Wills § 356 (1948)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added); see also In re Estate of MacPhee, 187 So.
2d 679 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). The presumption of undue influence from confi-
dential relations, active procurement, and substantial benefit operates to place heavy
burden on proponent to overcome presumption of undue influence. In re Estate of
Smith, 212 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (citing Peters and MacPhee with
approval).
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one that required production of evidence.1"5 The presumption could be
rebutted by any evidence that the testator acted freely. Evidence, if
presented, would then require the court to decide the issue on all the
evidence in the case. Thus, the presumption affected only the burden of
producing evidence and allowed a party to make a prima facie case of
undue influence. Thus, the burden of proof did not shift to the propo-
nent of the will, but rather remained with the party seeking revocation
at all times in the trial. These subsequent decisions, however, treated
the presumption as one which shifted the burden of proof to the propo-
nent of the will. This shift, unfortunately, occurred with little or no
discussion and created an area of uncertainty in Florida law. It would
remain for the Carpenter court to finally resolve the issue of the effect
of the presumption on the burden of proof in will cases.106
IV. CARPENTER AND ITS PHASE THREE PROGENY
Carpenter, decided in 1971, provided the first comprehensive dis-
cussion of the presumption of undue influence since Aldrich. Justice
McCain, writing for the court, first pointed to the reason for the pre-
sumption by observing that,
the difficulty of obtaining direct proof in cases where undue influ-
ence is alleged [has permitted] will contestants to satisfy their bur-
den initially by showing sufficient facts to raise a presumption of
undue influence. If this is done, and the presumption remains unre-
butted, the county judge is required to find undue influence and
deny the will probate. 07
The opinion next provided a systematic and exhaustive definition
of both confidential relationship and active procurement.'
The opinion then turned to the effect of the presumption, once es-
tablished, on the burden of proof.'09 The court initially observed that
previous decisions "consistently held that the burden of proof shifts to
105. Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 858.
106. See Carpenter, 253 So. 2d 697.
107. Id. at 701 (emphasis added). This is clearly cast in Thayer terms as it is
based on access to evidence and not public policy grounds. The proponent is, on a
common sense basis, the person in the best position to explain the reasons for the sus-
pect disposition. This is entirely consistent with the concurrence in Aldrich.
108. Id. at 701-02.
109. Id. at 702.
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the proponent when the presumption of undue influence arises."' 10 This
effect was, in Justice McCain's view, at variance with the "general rule
in respect to the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof
... ,, To Justice McCain, a presumption that arises in the course
of a case assists a party in discharging their particular burden of
proof." 2 The adversary, in most instances, must then give an explana-
tion so as to avoid the effect of the presumption.1" In this sense, most
presumptions really affect the order of proof and not the burden of
proof." 4 In the case of a presumption that assists a plaintiff, the burden
is on a defendant to produce evidence to rebut the effect of the pre-
sumption." 5 The risk of non-persuasion; i.e., the strict burden of proof
remains; with the plaintiff throughout the trial." 6
This, to the Carpenter court, created two types of presumptions;
the general rule discussed above and the burden-shifting presumption
applicable in will contest cases." 7 In the court's view, this was incorrect
on both policy and statutory grounds." 8
From a policy standpoint, the court recognized the difficulty of
proof of undue influence because "in will contests the testator is not
available as a witness to tell his version of such dealings, that in fact
usually the only person who is available to testify is the confidential
adviser whose self-interest furnishes a motive for him to take advantage
of his superior position."" 9 These considerations were not sufficient to
justify burden-shifting presumption because "it is frequently as difficult
to disprove undue influence as to prove it, the practical effect of shift-
ing the burden of proof is to raise the presumption virtually to conclu-
sive status and require a finding of undue influence .. .. *"I" This re-
sult was also undesirable because "much of the discretion of the trial
judge to evaluate and weigh the evidence before him is lost and with it
one of the most valuable services we call on trial judges to perform in
110. Id.
111. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 703-04.
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non-jury cases." 2
The court also felt this result was compelled by the intent of the
applicable statute then in effect, Florida Statute section 732.31 22 That
intent, in the court's view, required that "the burden of proof in will
contests shall be on the contestant to establish the grounds constituting
the facts upon which the probate of the purported will is opposed."1 13
The practical effect of this approach was threefold:
First, the burden will be satisfied when the beneficiary comes for-
ward with a reasonable explanation for his or her active role in the
decedent's affairs. The precise nature of the explanation will vary
depending on the facts giving rise to the presumption, and the suffi-
ciency of the explanation to rebut the presumption will be for the
county judge to determine subject to review by the appellate court.
Second, when the burden is satisfied the presumption will vanish
from the case and the county judge will be empowered to decide
the case in accord with the greater weight of the evidence without
regard to the presumption. Third, since the facts giving rise to the
presumption are themselves evidence of undue influence, those
facts will remain in the case and will support a permissible infer-
ence of undue influence, depending on the credibility and weight
assigned by the trial judge to the rebuttal testimony.1 2 4
Carpenter was, of course, a pre-Evidence Code case, but it is ap-
parent that the court targeted the Aldrich presumption of undue influ-
ence as a Thayer or bursting bubble type of presumption. This is ap-
parent from the effect of rebuttal testimony in a given case and from
the basis the court gave for the presumption. The court, in reducing the
effect given to Aldrich, was clearly concerned with the obvious diffi-
culty of obtaining direct evidence of undue influence.12 5 Thus, the pre-
sumption's basis is the superior knowledge of the beneficiary who occu-
pied the confidential relationship, was active in the decedent's affairs,
and who drew the benefit.1 26 Viewed in this sense, the Carpenter court
treated it as a device designed to facilitate determination of an action.
In Evidence Code terms, the presumption in Carpenter did not involve
public policy considerations at all. In rejecting a burden-shifting type
121. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 704.
122. Id. at 703-04.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 704.
125. Id. at 703-04.
126. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 704.
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of presumption, the Carpenter court mentioned policy, but a close ex-
amination reveals that these factors such as access to proof are, to most
commentators, ones designed to facilitate an action and are, thus, of
the bursting bubble or Thayer type.12 7
Carpenter, in effect, attempted to correct a perceived imbalance in
Florida case law that had occurred after the presumption, of testamen-
tary undue influence was recognized and defined in Aldrich.12 8 Viewed
in this historical context, Carpenter is totally consistent with Aldrich.
In addition, Carpenter, as Aldrich, recognized a permissible inference
arising from the same three factors that gave rise to the presumption if
contrary evidence was presented. 12 9 As indicated, the weight of the in-
ference was again directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 30
Taken as a whole, the Carpenter decision expresses a preference
for a determination of undue influence from all the evidence in the
case.' 31 The decision also can be viewed as one which places great reli-
ance on the initial fact-finder. 32 Viewed in this context, Carpenter
marks, in my view, an attempted return to the initial approach dis-
cussed previously in this paper; the fact-specific test. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the simple fact that no Florida case has ever
rejected the approach approved and utilized in the pre-Aldrich cases.
In view of the Carpenter court's preference for a broadened role
for the fact-finding process, one might have expected the confidential-
relations presumption to occupy a less central role in subsequent undue
influence decisions. This has not been the case. In addition, with one
exception, appellate decisions have not addressed the impact of the Evi-
dence Code on the role of the presumption in undue influence cases.
The balance of the discussion will, therefore, be devoted to post-Car-
127. Id. at 703. Petitioners urged that policy considerations inherent in the diffi-
culty of proof of undue influence dictate that the burden of proof should shift in this
case. They note that in will cases the testator is not available as a witness to tell his
version of such dealings. That, in fact, usually the only person who is available to tes-
tify is the confidential advisor whose self-interest furnishes a motive for him to take
advantage of his superior position. This rationale, unlike the presumption of innocence
or presumption of the validity of a second marriage, was centered on an access to
evidence basis. Viewed in this context, it remained, to Justice McCain, a Thayer
presumption.
128. Id. at 704.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 704.
132. Id.
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penter decisions and the Evidence Code as it relates to the
presumption.
Clark v. Grimsley,133 In re Siddon's Estate," and In re Estate of
Van Aken, 35 were early post-Carpenter cases involving the Aldrich-
Carpenter presumption. In Clark, the testatrix, a 97-year-old woman
confined to a nursing home, executed a will shortly before her death
which left the bulk of her estate to one daughter. This disposition re-
voked a prior will that allowed the daughters to share equally.' 36 There
was also direct documentary evidence, consisting of letters written by
the testatrix, of undue influence by the beneficiary daughter.' 37 Addi-
tionally, the evidence clearly demonstrated the beneficiary daughter's
involvement in the preparation and execution of the will. 38 Finally, the
record demonstrated that the daughter, due to her dominant role in her
mother's financial affairs, was in a "highly fiduciary capacity."' 139 In
the court's view, these unrebutted facts established a presumption of
undue influence; thus, the court reversed and directed that the prof-
fered will be denied probate. 40
The record in Clark also contained factors that under the pre-Al-
drich fact-specific approach alone would have been probative of undue
influence. Those factors included: the physical condition of the testa-
trix, the unnatural testamentary disposition, a change in testamentary
scheme, solicitation of the challenged will by the beneficiary, persua-
sion by the beneficiary, will drawn for the beneficiary by a fiduciary,
unequal disposition, circumstances surrounding execution, and finally
the obvious interest of the beneficiary.' 4 ' Thus, apart from the pre-
sumption itself, the evidence pattern supported a finding of undue influ-
ence under the fact-specific approach. This aspect of the evidence, due
to the emphasis placed on the presumption and its effect, received no
discussion.
133. 270 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
134. 297 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
135. 281 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
136. Clark, 270 So. 2d at 54.
137. Id. at 55.
138. Id. at 58.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Clark court, despite Carpenter, treated the presumption as burden
shifting. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Carpenter, Knight and Aldrich.
Id. at 58 n.10-12. Knight, discussed previously, so held; Carpenter clearly did not; Al-
drich, when closely read, also did not. Id.
141. Clark, 270 So. 2d at 57.
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In re Siddon's Estate provided yet another example of the contin-
uing dominance of the presumption in probate litigation. The facts in
Siddons established that the beneficiary-brother enjoyed a confidential
relationship with his father, the decedent. The evidence also revealed
that the beneficiary-brother's wife typed the will in question and se-
cured the witnesses. Needless to say, the beneficiary-brother was a ma-
jor devisee under the purported will.14 2
The trial court, in its detailed findings, found the presumption op-
erative but explained by the surrounding circumstances. 14' In affirming,
the Third District Court of Appeal apparently144 accepted the court's
conclusion and affirmed.
A fact-specific analysis produces a less convincing picture. The fol-
lowing additional factors, apart from the presumption, were also pre-
sent: an opportunity to exercise undue influence existed because the de-
cedent lived with the beneficiary; an unnatural disposition occurred
when the beneficiary profited at the expense of brothers and sisters;
unusual circumstances surrounded the execution where the beneficiary
both arranged for and obtained witnesses; and the will was drawn at
the direction of the beneficiary who was in a confidential
relationship. 145
The court found that the record also revealed that the decedent
was cared for in his last illness by the beneficiary and his wife. Further,
the decedent was described as a strong-willed, opinionated and self-de-
termined character.' 6 In addition, the evidence revealed that the testa-
tor-father retained the will and that all involved knew of the will's exis-
tence and its provisions.147
Once: again, however, the presumption occupied center stage to the
exclusion of evidentiary factors that were indicative of possible undue
influence apart from the presumption. In addition, those factors indica-
tive of a reasonable explanation, while mentioned, do not receive a sys-
142. Siddon's, 297 So. 2d at 55.
143. I'd. at 57.
144. The inexplicably characterized opinion states that the actions of the benefi-
ciary and his wife in preparing the will and arranging for its execution are perfunctory
and not active procurement. Therefore, in the Third District Court of Appeal's view,
the presumption was not operative. As further discussion will demonstrate, under a
fact-specific analysis, these facts were of great significance.
145. Siddon's, 297 So. 2d at 55-57.
146. Id. at 57.
147. Id. Under the fact-specific approach, these latter facts would, of course, be
relevant on the issue of undue influence.
19911
19
Fennelly: Undue Influence in Will Contests
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
tematic analysis.
In re Estate of Van Aken, noted above, continued the post-Car-
penter trend.148 In Van Aken, the facts revealed that the beneficiary
was active in the decedent's affairs, arranged for execution of the will,
dictated its terms, obtained the attorney who drafted it and was, of
course, the sole beneficiary. 19 The Second District Court of Appeal
had no difficulty in determining that the confidential relation presump-
tion was present and that evidence of family discord was an insufficient
explanation. 50
What is again significant about the opinion is the lack of discus-
sion concerning factors that would clearly support a conclusion of un-
due influence even if the presumption were not present. Those factors
were abundant and consisted of: 1) opportunity-the beneficiary lived
with the testator; 2) susceptibility-the testator was described as a
sick, depressed man who had not recovered from the death of his wife;
3) unnatural disposition-his children were excluded; 4) change in for-
mer testamentary dispositions-children and grandchildren were bene-
ficiaries under prior will; and 5) obvious motive of the beneficiary. Fur-
thermore, the record reveals that after execution of the questioned will
the beneficiary took possession of it.' 5 ' Under a fact-specific approach,
even without the presumption, the evidence of undue influence was
overwhelming.
The pattern has continued in more recent cases. The 1979 Third
District case of In re Estate of Robertson' provided yet another ex-
ample. Both the trial and appellate courts' decisions centered on the
presence or absence of the presumption. The facts in Robertson estab-
lished that shortly before her death, the decedent executed a will that
excluded two grandchildren and left the bulk of her estate to the re-
maining grandchild. 5 The evidence clearly established that while the
beneficiary-granddaughter had a confidential relationship with dece-
148. See In re Estate of Van Aken, 281 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1973). The Van Aken court, as did the Clark court, also apparently misread Carpenter.
The court described the presumption as placing the burden of "overcoming the pre-
sumption" of undue influence on the proponent of the will. Id. at 918.
149. Id. at 917-18.
150. Id. at 918.
151. Id.
152. In re Estate of Robertson, 372 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
see also In re Estate of Lomax, 395 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
153. Robertson, 372 So. 2d at 1139.
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dent, there was no active procurement of the will by the beneficiary. 15
Therefore, both the trial and appellate court found the presumption
inapplicable to the case.155
Once again, salient factors indicative of undue influence received
no extended analysis or discussion. Similarly, countervailing factors
that contraindicated a finding of undue influence were not analyzed. In
addition to a confidential relationship, there was evidence of a change
in testamentary scheme, an unnatural disposition, and an opportunity
to exercise undue influence. Moreover, the record is silent as to the
decedent s relationship with excluded grandchildren, containing no ex-
planation for exclusion of the other grandchildren.1 56
The record also contained evidence showing that the will in ques-
tion was the product of the decedent's own choice in that she selected
the attorney, dictated its terms, and was fully competent. The ques-
tioned will was also publicly made and its execution was videotaped.
Finally, the will was kept in the possession of the attorney and the ben-
eficiary was unaware of its contents until the death of her grand-
mother.157 The result in Robertson is undoubtedly correct, but once
again demonstrated the continued dominance of the presumption.
Williamson v. Kirby, 5 8 a 1980 decision authored by Justice
Grimes, also illustrated both the dominance of the presumption and the
continuing difficulties that its proper application engenders. In Wil-
liamson, a 90-year-old woman conveyed, for no consideration, her
home to a woman who stood in a confidential relationship to her.159 The
trial court found, in detailed findings, that the evidence demonstrated
undue influence both from the presumption and as a whole.' 60
The record amply demonstrated that the trial court applied a to-
tality of the circumstances, fact-specific approach, in addition to the
presumption. The evidence convincingly demonstrated that under both
a totality test and a presumption approach, the trial court's conclusion
was supported by competent substantial evidence.' 6'
Justice Grimes, writing for the court, approved the trial court's
finding that the presumption was applicable. Justice Grimes then set
154. Id. at 1141-42.
155. Id. at 1142.
156. Id. at 1141-42.
157. Id. at 1142.
158. 379 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
159. Id. at 694.
160. Id. at 695.
161. Id.
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forth his view as to the effect of the presumption on a given case by
stating that
the beneficiary then has the burden of explaining his active involve-
ment in the preparation of the will [or gift]. He does not have the
burden of disproving undue influence. If the explanation is reasona-
ble, the presumption vanishes and it becomes the court's responsi-
bility to determine whether the contestant has established undue
influence by the great weight of the evidence. 162
The opinion, in view of the trial court's specific findings on the
evidence as a whole, arguably reweighed the evidence and substituted
the view of the panel for the findings of the trial court. This conclusion
is supported by the trial court's extensive factual findings apart from
the presumption.
In addition, the opinion ignored the permissive inference of undue
influence that remained when the presumption was rebutted. As indi-
cated earlier in this discussion, Carpenter clearly permitted a permis-
sive inference of undue influence to be drawn by the fact-finder even
when the presumption is rebutted. Williamson would, then, appear
both to misapply Carpenter and engage in unwarranted appellate fact-
finding.16
Three more recent decisions illustrated that the presumption con-
tinued its role as the prominent factor in probate litigation in which
undue influence was an issue.
Elson v. Vargas"" involved a housekeeper who was made sole ben-
eficiary of her employer's estate. 165 The trial judge found factually that
the Aldrich-Carpenter presumption was applicable, but that the benefi-
ciary had demonstrated a reasonable explanation for involvement in the
decedent's affairs.1 66 In affirming, the Third District Court of Appeal
noted that while this was a "close case, ' 67 the trial court's finding of
no undue influence, which was based on the housekeeper's explanation
for her role in the decedent's affairs, was supported by record
162. Id.
163. See also Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 392 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) ("When that happens, the presumption vanishes, and the trial court is left
to decide the case in accordance with the greater weight of the evidence.").
164. 520 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
165. Id. at 77.
166. Id. at 78.
167. Id.
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evidence."'6
Fogel v. Swann'69 involved testamentary provisions and gifts made
by the decedent to her sister and brother-in-law.1 0 The will in question
was prepared at the direction of the brother-in-law, who was the dece-
dent's attorney. There was also record evidence that established that
the will represented a change in testamentary scheme occurring shortly
before her death."' The Third District approved the trial court's fac-
tual determination that the close family relationship between the sister
and the decedent provided an evidentiary basis for a determination that
undue influence was not present.1 2
In Sun Bank v. Hogarth,'7 3 the trial court found that the chal-
lenged will was the product of undue influence. 74 The record contained
numerous indicia of undue influence apart from the presumption. These
factors, applying a fact-specific approach, would have supported a con-
clusion of undue influence even absent the presumption. However,
neither the trial court's nor the appellate court's opinions discussed this
possibility; rather the case was decided on the basis of the presence and
effect of the Aldrich-Carpenter presumption.7
These latest cases demonstrated that the historical trend begun by
Aldrich has continued to the present. The presumption, therefore, con-
tinues to dominate to the exclusion of other evidentiary factors. This
over-emphasis has, in my view, stilted Florida case law on this issue
and in some instances produced unfortunate results.
V. A CRITICAL LOOK AT CARPENTER AND THE CODE
Carpenter was, of course, decided prior to enactment of the Evi-
dence Code. In view of Codal provisions governing presumptions, it is
necessary to discuss the possible treatment that may be given to the
presumption in the future. That issue remains an open question at this
juncture. What follows, therefore, is an analysis of the Carpenter pre-
sumption from the Evidence Code perspective.
The Code provides for two types of rebuttable presumptions in
168. Id.
169. 523 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
170. Id. at 1228.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1229-30.
173. 536 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
174. Id. at 265.
175. Id. at 266-67.
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civil cases. The first affects the burden of producing evidence and is
designed to facilitate the determination of a proceeding. When unre-
butted, it requires the fact-finder to find the presumed fact. If rebutted,
however, the presumption vanishes from the case. 1' This type of pre-
sumption is described as a Thayer or bursting bubble presumption and,
as indicated, operates in a given case so as to place upon the party best
able to furnish it the burden of producing evidence to rebut the pre-
sumed fact. "7 Even after being rebutted, however, a bursting bubble or
Thayer presumption permits the fact-finder to draw a permissive
inference.
The second type of presumption, which by definition involves pub-
lic policy considerations, operates in a much different manner. 178 The
second type of presumption shifts the burden of proof to the party
against whom the presumption operates. Under this type of presump-
tion, the fact-finder must be convinced that the presumed fact does not
exist. 79 The Code further provides that unless "otherwise provided by
Statute, a presumption established primarily to facilitate the determi-
nation of the particular proceeding in which the presumption is applied
rather than to implement public policy is a presumption affecting the
burden of producing evidence."' 180
Gard, noted previously, has described the operation and effect of
Thayer presumptions in the following manner:
Presumptions which owe their existence only to facilitating the de-
termination of the action actually can be expected to have very lit-
tle to support them on the basis of strong probative value of the
basic facts. Quite the opposite is true of those presumptions which
rest on basic facts so strong as to promote a public policy principle
arising from experience with human conduct.' 8 '
Gard then noted prophetically, "It will be up to the courts to sort
out the presumptions . ".1.."82 The Thayer presumption can be viewed
as a utilitarian device while the Morgan presumption is one reflective
176. FLA. STAT. § 90.302(1) (1989).
177. See EHRHARDT, supra note 69, at § 302.1; GARD, supra note 69, at § 3:05.
178. FLA. STAT. § 90.302(2) (1989).
179. See EHRHARDT, supra note 69, at § 304.1; GARD, supra note 69, at §§ 3:01-
:03.
180. FLA. STAT § 90.303 (1989).
181. GARD, supra note 69, at § 3:05.
182. Id.
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of societal values that require protection.
A close examination of Carpenter reveals that its author viewed
the presumption of undue influence as a procedural utilitarian device.
Justice 'McCain clearly indicated that a burden-shifting presumption
would be an anomaly in Florida case law. He was also concerned that a
policy presumption would be virtually unrebuttable. Finally, McCain
saw the beneficiary accused of undue influence as the person usually
uniquely situated to explain his role with the decedent and thus rebut
the presumption.183 This view was also consistent with the historical
development of the presumption post-Aldrich. That development re-
flected that the presumption, without apparent explanation or analysis,
underwent a metamorphosis from a procedural device to a statement of
public policy; that is, from a utilitarian device to a doctrinal
imperative.
To use a reverse flip, Carpenter viewed the presumption as a but-
terfly which became a caterpillar. This view is also consistent with the
opinion's Sotto Voce major theme. That theme expresses a clear prefer-
ence for comprehensive fact finding in contrast to decisions based on a
rigid, inflexible and, in McCain's view, largely unwarranted legal
device.184
The statutory construction basis advanced in Carpenter for a
Thayer-type presumption appears, in light of the Code today, to be
more questionable. As noted by both Ehrhardt and Gard, the Code en-
visions a judicial determination of the basis and operation of presump-
tions. At least one post-Code case has attempted to classify the Al-
drich-Carpenter presumption along lines envisioned by the Code.
Judge Glickstein, writing for a Fourth District panel, attempted to
address the basis for the presumption of undue influence in the 1983
case of In re Estate of Davis. 85 In Davis, the panel held that on public
policy grounds, "[the presumption [of undue influence] in this case
was non-vanishing because, we believe, a strong social policy exists
when the issue is the alleged exercise of undue influence by one en-
joying, as, here, a confidential relationship with a decedent."1 86 Subse-
quently, the Fourth District Court of Appeal receded from Davis in a
somewhat cryptic opinion which merely held the correct and applicable
principles of law were announced in Carpenter and followed by the
183. Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703.
184. See generally id. at 702.
185. 428 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
186. Id. at 776.
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trial court.187
It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the presumption in
view of the Evidence Code. Carpenter, in my opinion, clearly viewed
the presumption as a proof facilitation device. This, in turn, is based on
the common sense proposition that the beneficiary who enjoyed the re-
lationship and procured the will is in the best position to explain those
events and to give the reasonable explanation. Although Carpenter
speaks somewhat in policy terms, the Carpenter decision as well as the
Aldrich decision, rested on the notion that the beneficiary was in the
best position to explain the circumstances of the bequest.188
The public policy grounds supporting a burden-shifting presump-
tion also appear obvious. The law abhors coercion and the basic public
policy considerations must reject testamentary dispositions that are the
result of coercion. Additionally, public policy considerations peculiar to
a confidential relationship are also operative. It is well settled law that
such a relationship imposes the highest duty on the dominant party in
the relationship. These policy considerations would seem to dictate
that, on policy grounds, the presumption of undue influence should op-
erate to shift the burden of proof onto the party who stood in such a
relationship to the decedent. This position is further buttressed by a
factor somewhat unique to Florida, its large elderly population. Unfor-
tunately, in many instances due to illness, death of a spouse, or isola-
tion from extended families in their native states, elderly Floridians are
vulnerable to improper influence in testamentary dispositions. Counter-
vailing considerations do, however, exist.
The public policy of Florida has long supported the right of a per-
son to freely devise his or her property in any way that person desires.
A burden-shifting presumption possibly could be antithetical to that
policy. The very breadth of Carpenter's definition of a confidential rela-
tionship and active procurement make the presumption a rather easy
one to raise in a given case. Thus, the Carpenter court's concern with
the presumption becoming virtually conclusive appears legitimate.
Finally, also militating against a burden-shifting presumption is
187. In re Estate of Davis, 462 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Judge
Glickstein's concurrence in Davis I provides an excellent and comprehensive discussion
of the purpose and effect of presumptions in general and of the presumption of undue
influence in particular. Davis H also appears in conflict with another Fourth District
opinion also authored by Judge Glickstein, Insurance Company of Pennsylvania v. Es-
tate of Guzman, 421 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Guzman recognized
the necessity of evaluating existing presumptions in light of the Code.
188. See Carpenter, 253 So. 2d at 703; Aldrich, 3 So. 2d at 856.
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another sad reality of life: family estrangement. Not uncommonly, eld-
erly people may for one reason or another become alienated from those
who the law might regard as the natural objects of their bounty and
turn to a particularly trusted friend or relative for assistance and sup-
port. This is particularly true in times of illness or disability. The fore-
going would seem to be valid public policy considerations in opposition
to a burden-shifting presumption. Thus, it could be argued that policy
considerations are in rough equipoise. In such a situation, according to
Gard, neither presumption should prevail.189 In the context of this dis-
cussion, then, the Evidence Code may not resolve this issue. Resolution,
in my view, lies with a proper reading of Carpenter and a return to the
more comprehensive approach to fact finding that was employed in the
pre-Aldrich and pre-Carpenter decisions.
The Aldrich-Carpenter presumption of undue influence has be-
come a shibboleth in Florida law. As indicated, it has itself exercised
undue influence over the Bench and the Bar. In this sense, Carpenter
was profoundly correct. The subject presumption grew without analysis
from a sound procedural device that permitted the fact-finder to draw a
permissive conclusion based on experience to an evidentiary runaway
freight train that obliterated the finely crafted decisions that were de-
veloped prior to the historical detour beginning with Aldrich.
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that the distinctions of the law
are founded on experience, not logic. 9 ' Experience in this case demon-
strates that a case-specific approach provides the analytical format that
Carpenter does not provide; i.e., what constitutes a reasonable explana-
tion for a suspect devise. The fact-specific pre-Aldrich approach will
also broaden the evidentiary equation in undue influence cases so as to
focus on all relevant factors that should be considered in determining
whether undue influence invalidates a testamentary disposition. It will
also improve the accuracy of case-by-case determinations by putting
more focus on the total evidence picture and less on a procedural device
designed to facilitate the proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Aldrich-Carpenter presumption is an excellent procedural de-
vice that can assist the fact-finder in determining the issue of undue
influence by requiring that the beneficiary who stood in a confidential
189. GARD, supra note 69, at § 3:55.
190. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1949).
1991]
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relationship to the decedent provide a reasonable explanation for the
devise in question. The beneficiary is obviously in the best position to
do so. At present, however, the presumption occupies too central a role
in undue influence cases. To correct this imbalance, Florida courts
should once again use the earlier fact-specific approach to determine if,
apart from the presumption, undue influence exists in a given case.
This would improve the accuracy of probate proceedings in which the
issue of undue influence is present.
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